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 Introduction 
The attention to HAZardous MATerials transportation (HAZMAT) research dates back 
1980's, mainly due to growing safety concerns in developed countries (see, e.g., [1-18]). 
After a slight slow-down mainly caused by the difficulty of gathering accurate and 
relevant data, it has recently gained emphasis again (see, e.g., [19- 41]). 
This renewed interest is also owed to two factors that have acquired more and 
more importance in the recent years: sustainability and equity. 
Sustainability is a systemic concept that, according to World Commission on 
Environment and Development, relates to the continuity of economic, social, 
institutional and environmental aspects of human society. Hence, sustainability is the 
long-term compatibility between the economic and the environmental and the social 
dimensions of development (see, e.g., [42]). 
According to [4] equity regards the public sensitivity to HAZMAT as the 
beneficiaries from these shipments are usually those who live near production facilities 
or the delivery points, yet also the populations living along HAZMAT routes are also 
exposed to transportation risks (see, e.g., [15];[43];[44]). This lack of burden-benefit 
concordance is typical source of public opposition to hazardous material shipments. 
The shipment of nuclear fuel, also spent, offers a good example of equity-based public 
opposition (see, e.g., [1]; [45]; [46]; [47]; [48]; [49]; [50]; [51]; [52];[53]). 
The hazardous materials transportation requires a risk management process that 
involves set of crucial logistic decisions referring to, as an example, the organization of 
the emergency response operations. In fact, the logistical decisions on the routing of 
HAZMAT vehicles and the emergency response must be integrated (see, e.g., [54]). 
Quantification of risk of the "en-route" hazardous materials accidents is difficult 
because probabilities for traffic accidents are low and those involving hazardous 
materials are even lower. However, as the consequences of an accident involving 
hazardous materials can be enormous, researchers are whetted to model the risk 
associated with this shipment to propose various methods to design suitable routes that 
present interesting trade-offs between transportation costs and accident risks. 
This article is based on an idea of the first author, who is also Operations Director 
of S.p.A. Autovie Venete, to make an attempt to encompass both theoretical and 
application oriented papers from disparate areas related to the commercial transport of 
hazardous materials. S.p.A. Autovie Venete is an important Italian motorway 
concessionaire and safety is its main priority. Its operators manage HAZMAT 
transportation following different strategies and using different technologies to detect 
vehicles, to give the alarm and to properly intervene in case of accidents. 
This review takes into account the framework and the method of the former article 
[28]. The present article develops such a work, completes it with the most recent 
literature and it is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some important 
concepts about risk, the main factor that differentiate HAZMAT logistic problems from 
other logistic problems. We also review different models of risk assessment. In Section 
3, we offer a high-level view of HAZMAT logistics literature and we propose a 
classification scheme. In Section 4, we cluster and discuss the papers available in the 
literature according to the proposed scheme and we suggest directions for future 
research. Finally, we draw some concluding remarks in Section 5. 
1. Hazardous Materials and Risk 
In this section we initially define the concept of hazardous material and point out the 
possible sources of risk in their transportation. Then we introduce a classification of the 
basic risk assessment models. 
1.1.  What hazardous materials are 
According to the US Department of Transportation [55], a hazardous material is 
defined as any substance or material capable of causing harm to people, property, and 
the environment. There are nine major hazardous material classes: 
Class  1– Explosives (dynamite, caps) 
2– Gases (propane, anhydrous ammonia, chlorine, oxygen) 
3– Flammable Liquids (gasoline, oil, tars, diesel, kerosene) 
4– Flammable Solids (plastics, asphalt shingles) 
5– Oxidizing Substances (peroxides) 
6– Poisonous and infectious substances (herbicides, pesticide) 
7– Radioactive materials 
8– Corrosives (acids) 
9– Miscellaneous (PCB’s, dangerous wastes). 
The en-route hazardous materials involuntary accidents have low probability: [56]; 
[57] estimate as a typical accident rate the value of 3.0×10-6 accidents/vehicle-km. 
Nevertheless, the potentially catastrophic impacts attributed to such incidents and the 
large number of hazardous shipments raises serious fears to all stakeholders involved in 
and affected by the HAZMAT process i.e. governmental authorities, carriers, the local 
societies and social groups, and shippers. Yet some risk is imposed on the population 
living along the major highways or railways, who are asked to assume the risk with no 
clear benefits to them. For this reason, if the same main route segment is selected for 
shipments from multiple origins, the objection of people living along this route would 
increase considerably. These people are likely to prefer alternate routings that would 
spread the risks. Public opposition to hazardous material shipments has increased in 
recent years, due to fears of terrorist attacks on HAZMAT vehicles. 
In the event of an accident, it is important for first responders to know the nature of 
the hazardous materials involved. Hence, for example, vehicles transporting hazardous 
materials must display unified placards describing the class and the nature of the cargo. 
On the other hand, making HAZMAT vehicles easy to identify through placards 
exposes them to another kind of risk: sabotage or misuse as weapons of mass 
destruction or of convenience. 
The possibility of accidents requires the development of integrated safety 
management systems to implement mitigation activities, which seek the reduction of 
the vulnerability, and prevention activities, which try to reduce the hazard [58]. 
Theoretically, risk management activities can be oriented to deal with specific and 
defined risk and manage it optimally. Unfortunately, reality is far too complex and 
resources far too scarce to deal with each risk event individually, as often one 
hazardous event is linked or related to one or more other hazardous events. Some 
events triggered others. As an example [59], urban degradation caused, e.g., by 
unplanned urban growth, bad construction practices, or immigration of people from the 
rural areas, tends to disturb the balance in the urban system, influences the interaction 
process between different hazards and vulnerabilities increasing vulnerability levels, 
and then creates new hazards factors. 
1.2. Risk assessment 
Risk assessment is included in risk management. The key elements of risk management 
are divided into two phases: the pre-disaster phase and the post-disaster phase. The pre-
disaster phase includes risk identification, risk mitigation, risk transfer, and 
preparedness; the post-disaster phase is devoted to emergency response and 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. Table 1 divides the key components of disaster risk 
management into actions required in the pre-disaster phase and actions needed in the 
post-disaster period [60]). A comprehensive risk management program addresses all 
these components: they are an integrated, cross-sector network of institutions 
addressing all the above phases of risk reduction and disaster recovery. Activities that 
need support are policy and planning, reform of legal and regulatory frameworks, 
coordination mechanisms, strengthening of participating institutions, national action 
plans for mitigation policies, and institutional development. 
Risk assessments are an essential part of the process of integrating natural disaster 
programs with overall development objectives. These assessments identify sources of 
risk, vulnerable groups, and potential interventions. Risk assessment allows 
policymakers to specifically define the objectives of the risk management programs 
and to establish vulnerability reduction targets. 
In the context of HAZMAT transportation, risk is characterized by two aspects: 
occurrence probability of an event and consequences of an occurring event. According 
to Alp [61], “risk is a measure of the probability and severity of harm to an exposed 
receptor due to potential undesired events involving a HAZMAT whereas the exposed 
receptor can be a person, the environment, or properties in the vicinity”. The undesired 
events are the accidents that could lead to a release of a HAZMAT. Risk assessment 
connotes a systematic approach to organizing and analyzing scientific knowledge and 
information for potentially hazardous activities or for substances that might pose risks 
under specified circumstances [62]. Risk assessment can be qualitative or quantitative. 
Qualitative risk assessment regards the identification of possible accident scenarios and 
attempts to estimate the undesirable consequences (see, e.g., [63]). Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (QRA) tries to assess the risk in terms of the value of some indicators to be 
used to actively manage risk, to identify and prioritize technology needs and decision 
making and, finally, to evaluate regulatory alternatives (see, e.g., [64]; [65]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Key Elements of Risk Management 
 
Pre-disaster phase Post-disaster phase 
Risk 
identification 
Mitigation 
Risk 
transfer 
Preparedness Emergency response 
Rehabilitation 
and 
reconstruction 
Hazard 
assessment 
(frequency, 
magnitude, 
and location) 
Physical/ 
structural 
mitigation 
works 
Insurance 
and reinsurance 
of public 
infrastructure 
and 
private assets 
Early warning 
systems and 
communication 
systems 
Humanitarian 
assistance 
Rehabilitation 
and 
reconstruction 
of damaged 
critical 
infrastructure 
Vulnerability 
assessment 
(population 
and 
assets 
exposed) 
Land-use 
planning 
and 
building 
codes 
Financial market 
instruments 
(catastrophe 
bonds and 
weather indexed 
hedge funds) 
Contingency 
Planning 
(utility 
companies 
and public 
services) 
Clean-up, 
temporary 
repairs, and 
restoration 
of services 
Macroeconomic 
and budget 
management 
(stabilization and 
protection of 
social 
expenditures) 
Risk 
assessment 
(a function of 
hazard 
and 
vulnerability) 
Economic 
incentives 
for 
promitiga- 
tion 
behavior 
Privatization 
of public services 
with 
safety regulation 
(energy, water, 
and 
transportation) 
Networks of 
emergency 
responders 
(local and 
national) 
Damage 
assessment 
Revitalization for 
affected sectors 
(exports, tourism, 
and agriculture) 
Hazard 
monitoring 
and 
forecasting 
(GIS, 
mapping, and 
scenario 
building) 
Education, 
training 
and 
awareness 
about risks 
and 
prevention 
Calamity Funds 
(national or 
local level) 
Shelter 
facilities 
and 
evacuation 
plans 
Mobilization of 
Recovery 
resources 
(public, 
multilateral, 
and insurance) 
Incorporation of 
disaster 
mitigation 
components in 
reconstruction 
activities 
 
[66] define risk on the basis of historical data, that is, as: 
Exposure
EventsRisks =                                                                                           (1) 
where Exposure is an exposure measure, such as truck miles, and Events is the 
weighted number of releases or vehicular accidents. Here, the weight associated to an 
event expresses the level of its severity. The strength of indicators as (1) is that they 
represent an integrated comprehensive measure of both frequency and severity of the 
past undesired events, and for this reason they are frequently used in literature to assess 
the risk. On the other hand, the subjectivity, in defining the value of the weights that 
account for the severity of the events, is an unavoidable weakness of these indicators. 
In addition, such indicators may be not suitable to assess the risk of potential future 
occurrences, in presence, e.g., of technological advances. Different studies try to 
overcome this latter limitation (see, e.g., [67]; [68]; [69]). 
As these studies are usually focused on releases that occur on the road or, in a 
lesser extent, along railways, they assesses the risk by taking into consideration 
different factors such as population density, facility type, material to be shipped and 
exposure. The challenge is to convert these factors into quantitative values that allow to 
express the probability of a hazardous materials accident and a measure of the 
associated consequences (e.g. expected population exposure) to apply to the links of 
the road (rail) network so that the best (safest) routes can be determined. 
QRA involves the following key steps: (1) hazard and exposed receptor 
identification; (2) frequency analysis; and (3) consequence modeling. In addition, 
examination of risks on different types of exposed receptor is essential to cover 
different response characteristics in the risk assessment. Also, given the fact that public 
opposition is a function of perceived risks, perhaps more attention should be paid to 
quantifying and modeling of perceived risks. 
Each step of QRA presents some difficulties. For example, the consequence 
modeling step requires as inputs the territorial distribution of the population exposed to 
the consequences of an accident. Differently, many past studies roughly assumed 
uniform population density along transport links. 
1.2.1. Frequency analysis 
According to Ang [70], the frequency analysis involves: 
 
1. determining the probability of an undesirable event; 
2. determining the level of potential receptor exposure, given the nature of the 
event; 
3. estimating the degree of severity, given the level of exposure. 
 
Each stage of this assessment requires the calculation of a probability distribution. As 
an example [71], for each unit road segment, determine the joint probability of type of 
accident, release, incident, and consequence as follows. Let A be the accident event that 
involves an HAZMAT carrier, M the release event, and I the incident event; finally, let 
D be indicate the type of damage to an individual. Then, using Bayes' theorem, we 
obtain the probability of an injury resulting from an accident related to the HAZMAT 
is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ApAMpMAIpIMADpDIMAp ,,.,,, =                             (2) 
where p(.) denotes the probability of the event and p(.|.) the associated conditional 
probability. 
If lmS  denote the number of shipments of HAZMAT m on road segment l per year, 
then the product ( )DIMApS mllm ,,,⋅  corresponds to the  frequency of the 
occurrence of the hazardous release event with consequence D for a person in the 
neighbourhood of road segment l. 
In assessing the risk, the literature makes a distinction individual and societal risk. 
Such a distinction is justified as, if few people are present around the hazardous activity, 
the societal risk may be close to zero, whereas the individual risk may be quite high. 
• Individual Risk: [72] defines the individual risk as the yearly death frequency 
for an average individual at a certain distance from the impact area. The analytical 
expressions for individual risk are often mathematically complex and their value 
can only determined numerically. As an example, [73] and [74] propose a model 
that requires the following high level variables to assess the individual risk: 1) 
frequency of release, 2) probability of final outcome given a release, 3) wind 
probability, and 4) vulnerability. Then the individual risk is expressed as 
Individual Risk ( )∫∑= L unitj rel Riskjvlf ,,                                               (3) 
Being  
∑ ∑ ∫ ⋅= i k
o
wind
out
unit kiVkjpipRisk
π
θθ
2
),,(),,()(                                  (4) 
where frel (l,v,j) is the release frequency for link l, vehicle typology v in season j; 
pout(i) is the probability of final outcome i given a release; pwind (j,k,θ) is the probability 
for meteorology condition k, season j, wind direction θ; V (i,k,θ) is the vulnerability for 
outcome i, meteorology condition k, wind direction θ. Note the correspondence 
between frel(l,v,j) in (3) and the previously introduced product ),,,( DIMApS mllm ⋅  
by [28]. 
• Societal Risk: Rlm on road segment l of hazmat m is usually defined (see, e.g., 
[13]; [75]) as 
∫ ∫ ⋅=
L
llmlmlmxyllmlm dxdyyxPOPApAMpMAIpIMADpSR ),()()|().,(),,|(   (5) 
Where ),,|( IMADp mxyl  is the probability that individuals on location ),( yx  in 
the impact area L will be dead due to the incident on a route segment l and 
),( yxPOPl  is the population density on location in the neighborhood of road 
segment l. By assuming that each individual in the affected population will incur the 
same risk, lmR  can be simply expressed as 
llmlmlmllmlm POPApAMpMAIpIMADpSR )()|(),|(),,|(=          (6) 
An alternative way to describe the societal risk is the use of the so-called FN-
curves, (see, e.g., [76] and [77]), where F is the cumulative frequency of an accident 
with N or more either fatalities or evacuated people. Such FN-curve are drawn by 
computing, the probability that a group of more than N persons would be impacted due 
to an HAZAMAT accident, for each (reasonable) value of N [78]. 
Expressions from (2) to (6) allow to assess the risk in the assumption that just one 
type of accident may happen. However, more than one type of accident, release, 
incident, and consequence can occur during the HAZMAT transport activity. For 
example, a release of flammable liquid can lead to a variety of incidents such as a spill, 
a fire, or an explosion. To accommodate this, [28] suggest assessing the risk as follows. 
Let A, M, I, and C denote respectively the set of possible accidents, releases, incidents, 
and consequences that may occur on road segment l. Suppose that all consequences 
(injuries and fatalities, property damage, and environmental damage) can be expressed 
in monetary terms. Then, the hazardous materials transport risk associated with road 
segment l can be expressed as 
( ) ccimai
Aa Mm li Cc
lml CONSCIMApSR ⋅⋅= ∑ ∑∑∑
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
,,,                                  (7) 
Where, CONS c is the possible c-type consequence. 
In practice, researchers frequently neglect conditional probabilities and simplify 
the analysis by considering the expected loss (or the worst-case loss) as the measure of 
risk. The expected value is calculated as the product of the probability of a release 
accident and the consequence of the incident [79]. Hence the HAZMAT risk associated 
with a road segment l is expressed as 
( ) lm
Mm
mlml cMpSR ⋅⋅= ∑
∈
                                                                                (8) 
where, clm is the undesirable consequence due to the release of hazmat m on road 
segment l. This risk model is sometimes referred to as the technical risk [71]. 
2.2.2 Security 
The risk assessment methodologies introduced in the previous section may need 
reviewing in the next future due to the new concern for security in HAZMAT 
transportation. The terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 have focused attention on what 
other targets terrorists may choose. It was quickly recognized that HAZMAT vehicles 
could be desirable targets for terrorists, and certain HAZMAT vehicles were designated 
as weapons of mass destruction, see [80]; [81]. Such concerns changed the way the 
HAZMAT industry operates. For example, the US Federal Government now requires 
HAZMAT truckers to submit to fingerprinting and criminal background checks [82]. 
The security issue, however, has not yet received much attention from the 
operations research (OR) literature. However, there is potential for OR studies, for 
example as below indicated. 
 
•  Rerouting around major cities - The risk of terrorist attacks made it very 
undesirable to route HAZMAT vehicles (particularly trains) through major 
population centres. In particular, [83] show that significant risk reductions are 
possible through rerouting, and [84] develop new methodology for routing 
with a catastrophe-avoidance objective. 
•  Changes in the modeling of incidence risks - The traditional risk assessment 
for HAZMAT assumes incidents are caused by traffic accidents or human 
error. We now know that there is a nonzero probability of a terrorist attack or 
a hijack. This fact increases the incident probabilities and requires a new way 
of modeling consequences since the impact may no longer be limited to the 
planned route. Furthermore, attack probabilities are unlikely to be uniform. 
For example, a tunnel, a bridge, or trophy buildings are likely to have higher 
attack probabilities than a remote and unpopulated area. In contrast, sparsely 
populated areas may be associated with a higher hijack probability. A hijacked 
vehicle's future route is unpredictable and special precautions may have to be 
taken to prevent it from having an incident in a densely populated area. As a 
result, traditional risk assessment-based route planning is no longer adequate. 
There are few papers on these subjects, but see [85] for probabilistic modeling 
of terrorist threats, and [86] and [40] for incorporation of security concerns in 
route planning. 
•  Changes in route planning methodology - Past HAZMAT routing literature 
focuses on finding a minimum risk route. Unfortunately, the use of 
quantitative measures and selecting routes accordingly make the routes 
predictable by terrorists. To minimize the probability of a successful terrorist 
attack or hijacking, shippers should use alternative routes. A game theory 
approach can be applied determine the best way of either alternating the routes 
or switching from one to other ones en-route time to minimize predictability. 
In this context, video surveillance, global positioning systems and 
communication equipment installed on all HAZMAT vehicles  allow the 
precise tracking of vehicles, but also allow the implementation of such real-
time decision making (see, e.g., [82]; [87]). 
2. HAZMAT logistics literature 
The book chapter [28] offers a relatively comprehensive of the literature up to 2005 on 
risk assessment, location, and routing. 
2.1. Special issues of journals 
Hazmat logistics has been a very active research area during the last twenty years. 
 
• Management Science Management Science published a special issue on Risk 
Analysis in 1984 (Vol.30, No.4) where five papers dealt with HAZMATs and 
hazardous facilities. This issue was followed by a number of special issues of 
refereed academic journals that focus on HAZMAT transportation or location 
problems. 
• Transportation Research Record published two special issues on HAZMAT 
transportation in 1988 (No.1193) that included four papers and 1989 
(No.1245) that included six papers. 
• Transportation Science devoted an issue to HAZMAT logistics in 1991 
(Vol.25, No. 2) that contained six papers. 
• Journal of Transportation Engineering published a special section on 
HAZMAT transportation in the March/April 1993 issue that included four 
papers. 
• INFOR published a special double-issue on hazardous materials logistics in 
1995 (Vol.33, No.1 and 2) with nine papers. 
• Location Science published four papers included in a special issue dealing 
with HAZMATs in 1995 (Vol.3, No.3). 
• Transportation Science produced a second special issue with seven papers on 
HAZMAT logistics in 1997 (Vol.31, No.3). 
• Studies in Locational Analysis published a special issue on undesirable facility 
location in April 1999 (Vol.12) that contained seven papers. 
• Computers & Operations Research have published a HAZMAT logistics 
special issue in 2007 which contains results of the most recent research in the 
area in 13 papers. 
 
2.2. Books 
The following books are a good starting point for those who wish to familiarize with 
the terminology and the problem context. 
 
1. Transportation of Hazardous Materials (1993) - This book, edited by L. N. 
Moses and D. Lindstrom, Kluwer Academic Publishers, issues in Law, Social 
Science, and Engineering. It contains 18 articles presented at HAZMAT 
Transport '91, a national conference held at Northwestern University on all 
aspects of HAZMAT transport. While only a few of the articles use OR 
models and techniques, the book offers a multi-dimensional treatment of the 
subject and it is good reading for new researchers in the area. 
2. Institute for Risk Research, University of Waterloo (1992) - Three books were 
produced by this Institute as a result of the First International Consensus 
Conference on the Risks of Transporting hazardous materials, held in Toronto, 
Canada in April, 1992. 
3. Transportation of hazardous materials: Assessing the Risks (1993) - This 
book, edited by F.F. Saccomanno and K. Cassidy, contains 30 articles which 
are organized into five main chapters: Application of QRA models to the 
transport of hazardous materials; Analysis of hazardous materials Accident 
and Releases; Application of Simple Risk Assessment Methodology; 
Uncertainty in Risk Estimation; Risk Tolerance, Communication and Policy 
Implications. 
4.  Comparative Assessment of Risk Model Estimates for the Transport of 
hazardous materials by Road and Rail (1993) - This book, edited by F.F. 
Saccomanno, D. Leming, and A. Stewart, documents the assessment of a 
corridor exercise involving the application of several risk models to a common 
transport problem involving the bulk shipment of chlorine, LPG and gasoline 
by road and rail along predefined routes. The purpose of the corridor exercise 
was to provide a well defined transportation problem for analysis in order to 
examine the sources of variability in the risk estimates. Seven agencies in six 
countries participated in this exercise. 
5. What is the Risk (1993) - This book, edited by F.F. Saccomanno, D. Leming, 
and A. Stewart, book documents the small group discussions and consensus 
testing process from the corridor exercise conducted as part of the 
international consensus conference. 
6.  Hazardous materials transportation risk analysis (1994) - This book, edited 
by Rhyne WR, Van Norstrand Reinhold, develops a quantitative approaches 
for truck and train and it explains the QRA methodologies and their 
application to HAZMAT transportation. It also provides an extended example 
of a QRA for bulk transport of chlorine by truck and train. This detailed 
example explores every step of the QRA from preliminary hazards analysis to 
risk reduction alternatives. This book is a valuable reference for HAZMAT 
transportation risks, and it is intended for practitioners. It is not an OR book, 
but it provides useful information for OR research in HAZMAT transportation 
modeling and analysis. 
7.  Guidelines for chemical transportation risk analysis (1995) - This book, 
edited by American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical 
Process Safety (CCPS) New York, completes two other books in the series of 
process safety guidelines books produced by CCPS: Guidelines for Chemical 
Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (CPQRA, 1989) and Guidelines for 
Hazard Evaluation Procedures (HEP, 2nd edition, 1992). It is intended to be 
used as a companion volume to the CPQRA and HEP Guidelines when 
dealing with a quantitative transportation risk analysis (TRA) methodology. 
This book offers a basic approach to TRA for different transport modes 
(pipelines, rail, road, barge, water, and intermodal containers). It can be useful 
to an engineer or manager in identifying cost effective ways to manage and 
reduce the risk of a HAZMAT transportation operation. 
8.  Quantitative Risk Assessment of Hazardous Materials Transport Systems 
(1996)  - This book, edited by M. Nicolet-Monnier and A.V. Gheorge, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, contains a comprehensive treatment of the analysis and 
assessment of transport risks due to HAZMAT transport on roads, rail, by ship, 
and pipeline. It contains European case studies as well as a discussion of 
computer-based decision support system for HAZMAT transport problems. It 
is a useful reference book in the area. 
2.3. Classification 
The rest of this chapter deals mainly with the academic literature consisting of refereed 
journal articles. The number of papers published between 1982 and 2007s in this area 
of research has peaked in mid 1990s and has declined somewhat since 2004. 
In 2007 there is again a grow-up of the importance of the matter and of the number 
of articles. Given the large number of papers in these last twenty years, the articles deal 
with different aspects of the problem and can be classified as summarized in Tab.2 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Main subjects in HAZMAT transportations literature 
 
1. Risk assessment 3. Combined facility location and routing 
2. Routing 4. Network design 
 
According to [28], we believe in a simple classification that can be useful in 
providing some structure to the rest of the chapter. One possible classification is the 
following (in no particular order): 
C: with security consideration; DSS: Decision Support System model; G: using GIS; 
M: Multiobjective; S: Stochastic; T: Time-varying; U: Survey/Annotated Bibliography 
 
 Table 3 - A Classification of Hazmat Transportation Models 
 
Road 
Jonkman, et al. (2003), Nardini et al. (2003), 
Martinez-Alegria et al. (2003)G, Rosmuller and Van 
Gelder (2003), Abkowitz (2002)C, Fabiano et al. 
(2002), Kimberly and Killmer (2002), Saccomanno 
and Haastrup (2002)tunnels, Hollister (2002), Hwang 
et al. (2001), Abkowitz et al. (2001), Verter and 
Kara (2001)G, Efroymson and Murphy (2000), ICF 
Consulting (2000), Leonelli et al. (1999), Zhang et 
al. (2000)G, Pet-Armacost et al. (1999), Cassini 
(1998), Mills and Neuhauser (1998), Cutter and Ji 
(1997), Groothuis and Miller (1997), Lovett et al. 
(1997)G, Pine and Marx (1997), Alp and Zelensky 
(1996), Ertugrul (1995), Sissell (1995), 
Chakraborty and Armstrong (1995), Erkut and 
Verter (1995a)U, Erkut and Verter (1995b), Moore 
et al. (1995), Spadoni et al. (1995), Verter and 
Erkut (1995)U, Gregory and Lichtenstein (1994), 
Macgregor et al. (1994), Hobeika and Kim (1993), 
Sandquist et al. (1993), Harwood et al. (1993), 
Abkowitz et al. (1992), Glickman (1991), Grenney, 
et al. (1990)DSS, Kunreuther and Easterling (1990), 
Chow et al. (1990), Abkowitz and Cheng (1989), 
Ang and Briscoe (1989), Harwood et al. (1989), 
Abkowitz and Cheng (1988), Hillsman (1988), 
Horman (1987), Keeney and Winkler (1985), 
Scanlon and Cantilli (1985), Pijawka et al. (1985), 
Kunreuther, et al. (1984), Philipson et al. (1983), 
Keeney (1980), Shappert et al. (1973) 
Rail 
Anderson and Barkan (2004), Barkan et al. (2003), 
Fronczak (2001), Orr et al. (2001), Dennis (1996), 
Larson (1996), Glickman and Golding (1991), 
McNeil and Oh (1991), Saccomanno and El-Hage 
(1991), Saccomanno and El-Hage (1989), 
Glickman and Rosenfield (1984), Glickman (1983),  
Marine Douligeris, et al. (1997), Roeleven et al. (1995), Romer et al. (1995) 
Risk assessment 
Air LaFrance-Linden et al. (2001) 
Road + Rail 
Brown and Dunn (2007), Milazzo et al. (2002), 
Bubbico et al. (2000), Neill and Neill (2000), Deng 
et al. (1996), Leeming and Saccomanno (1994), 
Purdy (1993), Saccomanno, and Shortreed (1993), 
Saccomanno, et al. (1989), Vanaerde et al. (1989), 
Glickman (1988), Swoveland (1987) 
Road + Rail + Marine Andersson (1994) 
Road + Rail + Marine + Air Kloeber et al. (1979) 
Road 
Akgün et al. (2007), Duque et al. 
(2007), Erkut and Ingolfsson 
(2005), Huang and Cheu (2004)C, 
G, Huang et al. (2003)C, M, Kara et 
al.(2003), Luedtke and White 
(2002)C, Paté-Cornell (2002), 
Marianov et al. (2002), Frank et al. 
(2000), Erkut and Ingolfsson 
(2000), Leonelli et.al. (2000), 
Zografos et al. (2000)DSS, Erkut and 
Verter (1998), Tayi et al. (1999)M, 
Bonvicini et al. (1998), Marianov 
and ReVelle (1998)M, Verter and 
Erkut (1997), Sherali et al. (1997)M, 
Nembhard and White (1997)M, 
Erkut and Glickman (1997), Jin and 
Batta (1997), Verter and Erkut 
(1997), Erkut (1996), Jin et al. 
(1996), Ashtakala and Eno (1996)S, 
Beroggi and Wallace (1995), 
Boffey and Karkazis (1995), Erkut 
(1995), Moore et al. (1995), 
Karkazis and Boffey (1995), 
Glickman and Sontag (1995)M, 
McCord and Leu (1995)M, 
Sivakumar et al. (1995), Beroggi 
(1994), Beroggi and Wallace 
(1994), Ferrada and Michelhaugh 
(1994), Patel and Horowitz 
(1994)G, Lassarre et al. (1993)G, 
Sivakumar et al. (1993), Turnquist 
(1993)M, S, Wijeratne et al. 
(1993)M, Lepofsky et al. (1993)G, 
Beroggi and Wallace (1991), 
Miaou and Chin (1991), Gopalan et 
al. (1990a), Chin and Cheng 
(1989))M, Zografos and Davis 
(1989)M, Abkowitz and Cheng 
(1988)M, Batta and Chiu (1988), 
Vansteen (1987), Cox, and 
Turnquist (1986), Belardo et al. 
(1985), Saccomanno and Chan 
(1985), Urbanek and Barber (1980), 
Kalelkar and Brinks (1978)M 
Rail 
Verma and Verter (2005), McClure 
et al. (1988), Coleman (1984), 
Glickman (1983) 
Routing Local Routing 
Marine Iakovou (2001), Li et al. (1996), Haas and Kichner (1987) 
Road + Rail Glickman (1988) 
Road + Rail 
+ Marine Weigkricht and Fedra (1995) 
DSS 
Local Routing and Scheduling 
(on Road) 
Zografos and Androutsopoulos (2004)M, Zografos 
and Androutsopoulos (2002)M, Miller-Hooks and 
Mahmassani (2000)S,T, Bowler and Mahmassani, 
(1998)T, Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani (1998)S,T, 
Sulijoadikusumo and Nozick (1998)M,T, Nozick et 
al. (1997)M,T, Smith (1987)M, Cox and Turnquist 
(1986) 
Road 
Carotenuto et al. (2007a,b), 
Dell’Olmo et al. (2005), Akgün et 
al. (2000), Marianov and ReVelle 
(1998), Lindner-Dutton et al. 
(1991), Gopalan et al. (1990a, b), 
Zografos and Davis (1989) 
Global Routing 
Marine Iakovou et al. (1999) 
Combined facility 
location and 
routing 
Alumur and Kara (2007), Cappanera et al. (2004), Berman et el. (2000), Giannikos 
(1998)M, Helander and Melachrinoudis (1997), List and Turnquist (1998), Current 
and Ratick (1995)M, Jacobs and Warmerdam (1994), Boffey and Karkazis (1993), 
Stowers and Palekar (1993), List and Mirchandani (1991)M, List, et al. (1991)U, 
Revelle et al. (1991), Zografos and Samara (1989), Peirce and Davidson (1982), 
Shobrys (1981) 
Network design Erkut and Alp (2007a,b), Berman et al. (2007), Erkut and Gzara (2005), Verter and Kara (2005), Kara and Verter (2004) 
  
Although we have offered this simple classification, it is fair to say that numerous 
papers deal with problems that lie at the intersection of the above areas and such 
problems are receiving increasingly more attention in the literature. Table 3 suggests 
that the HAZMAT transportation problems on highways received the most attention 
from the operations researchers. In contrast, HAZMAT transportation via air or 
pipeline, as well as intermodal HAZMAT transportation has received almost no 
attention. 
3. Literary review of problems and models 
In Table 2, we suggest a schematic classification of the academic literature of 
HAZMAT that now we review. Rather than giving a detailed separate presentation of 
each work, we outline the most relevant guidelines emerging from the literature. We 
consider separately risk assessment and routing, combined facility location and 
network design. 
3.1. Risk Assessment 
Risk is defined as a measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic 
loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury [88]. 
Risk is an integral part of the hazardous materials transportation literature. The 
majority of articles are operations research studies for minimizing risk on a transport 
route. The risk equations in the OR studies tend to be relatively simple and are often 
variations on the release probability or the product of release probability and 
consequences. Other articles focus on calculating risk as part of QRA studies [23]. 
These latter articles are typically written by environmental, civil, and chemical 
engineers who incorporate demographic, meteorological, and chemical databases in 
calculating risk. These OR and QRA studies are focused on releases that occur on the 
road or along railways. There is not a focus on transport-support activities, such as 
loading or unloading of containers. Although there are differences in the accident 
scenarios surrounding these two activities, many of the variables and associations and 
hence the general Bayesian network structures are the same. 
The great majority of existing studies attempt to minimize or calculate the risk of 
potential future occurrences. The HAZMAT literature does not seem interested in 
modeling the past release incidents to determine the influence of the relevant variables. 
One notable exception is a study by [89] in which various sociological, behavioural, 
and perceptual variables affect the impact of an HAZAMAT release, was depicted 
using an influence diagram. From this perspective, the decision model suggested by 
Burns and Clemen is unique within the HAZMAT transport literature by virtue of its 
exploratory, statistical nature. In general, this literature lacks a focus on data-driven 
analysis of outcomes relative to the influencing variables. 
A possible reason of this lack is owed to the fact that past data are not very reliable. 
Using general truck accident data for HAZMAT trucks overestimates the accident 
probabilities. What makes matters worse is that there is no agreement on general truck 
accident probabilities and conflicting numbers are reported by different researchers. 
Furthermore, applying national data uniformly on all road segments of similar type is 
quite problematic since it ignores hot spots such as road intersections, highway ramps, 
and bridges. Researchers need to have access to high quality accident probability data 
and empirical or theoretical research that leads to improvements in the quality of such 
data should be welcome. [23] describe a quantitative risk assessment approach for 
hazardous materials transportation that employs considerable statistical data from past 
incidents. They illustrate application of this method to evaluating distances to which 
the public should be protected immediately following an accidental release of toxic 
materials that pose an inhalation hazard. While this paper focuses on emergency 
response aspects of the problem, the framework that they describe has applications to 
societal risk estimation and routing optimization for a wide variety of hazardous 
materials. 
Typically, accident and release probabilities have been estimated for a given road 
and area type using averaged values, which have limited sensitivity in specific 
situations (see, e.g., [90]). Differently, some recent empirical works suggest the use of 
fuzzy logic to determine the accident frequency (see, e.g., [91]). Additional exploratory 
work on accident probabilities is still needed. There is a lack of agreement on how 
HAZMAT transport risk should be represented [71]. 
 
Risk is described at least from seven different perspectives: 
 
• Accident or Release Probability [92] 
− Probability of a vehicular accident of the HAZMAT truck [93] 
− Probability of a vehicular accident that leads to release [94] 
− Probability of a release [71] 
• Consequences [95] 
• Consequence Probability 
− Individual Risk [96] 
− Societal Risk [71] 
• Numerical Indices [88]. 
• Exposure and Product of Exposure [97] 
• Expected Value [41] 
• Variations on Expected Value [74] 
 
However, as already described in Section 2.2 risk is usually assessed in terms of 
the following high-level variables: 1) accident or release probability, 2) consequence 
level, 3) population count, and 4) exposure amount, such as amount of HAZMAT 
transported. 
Several authors whose risk equations are limited to these high level variables 
characterize their risk models as simple (see e.g. [98]; [44]. More complex 
formulations [19] for risk assessment include the above high-level variables along with 
variables such as 5) wind probability or 6) fatality probability, also known as 
vulnerability. In turn, the latter variables are often specified in terms of sub-variables, 
or input parameters [99]. However, the numerical relationships of the sub-variables to 
the higher level variables or outcomes are not provided to the reader and are therefore 
not a discussion focus [73]. For example, [74] suggest that the release probability calls 
for the use of vehicle type and material type as sub-variables. However, they neither 
discuss nor provide in the article the exact numerical relationship of vehicle type or 
material type to release probability. 
 
3.2. Route Optimization for Hazardous Materials Transport 
In the following we briefly introduce some of the most relevant work dealing with 
route optimization for HAZMAT. 
[95] focus on the damage induced to the population in case of an accident. In this 
research study attention is given to the dispersion of the HAZMAT through air. 
Therefore, the impact area is not defined by a given bandwidth, but is a function 
dependent on the type of material transported and the meteorological conditions at the 
moment of the accident. 
[100] made research study that has considered a simplified approach to quantify 
risk. This research study focuses in the development of a spatial decision support 
system for the selection of route for the transport of HAZMAT within the United States 
of America. The element at risk considered is the population located in the impact area 
of the possible accident. The impact area is located alongside the route and it extents to 
both sides of the route up to a predefined bandwidth. 
[74] introduce a methodology based on the quantification of individual and societal 
risk indexes for the selection of optimal route for the transport of HAZMAT. The 
hazard considered is the accident probability of a HAZMAT transport unit, and the 
population is considered as the element at risk, being affected in the case of an accident. 
The population value results from aggregating the population travelling on the transport 
network and the population located adjacent to the transport network. In a previous 
article [73] mention that the use of individual and societal risk can give an accurate 
indication of risk, however to calculate these values, a great amount of data and 
programming effort is required. Due to this, a number of other simplified risk 
quantification techniques have been adopted in other research studies some of these are 
mentioned above. 
[41] consider the population as the element at risk. In this study the population 
located inside the impact area is assumed to have the same vulnerability value, namely 
one. The risk for the population is then defined as the product of the individual risk and 
the total population. Individual risk is assessed only on hazards, vulnerability, and 
element at risk. The previous results could be generalized assessing the individual risk 
on the basis of also the accident probability of a HAZMAT transport unit, and the 
population is considered as the element at risk, being affected in the case of an accident 
as proposed by [73]. 
[101] describe a method for finding nondominated paths for multiple routing 
objectives in networks where the routing attributes are uncertain, and the probability 
distributions that describe those attributes vary by the time of day. This problem is 
particularly important in routing and scheduling of shipments of very hazardous 
materials. The method developed extends and integrates the work of several previous 
authors, resulting in a new algorithm that propagates means and variances of the 
uncertain attributes along paths and compares partial paths that arrive at a given node 
within a user-specified time window. The comparison uses an approximate stochastic 
dominance criterion. 
[102] study the problem of determining a path for a shipment of hazardous 
materials between a pre-specified origin-destination pair on the plane taking into 
account minimization of risks during the transportation and cost of the path. Given a 
source point a, a destination point b, a set S of demand sites (points in the plane) and a 
positive value I, the authors want to compute a path connecting a and b with length at 
most I such that the minimum distance to the points in S is maximized. They propose 
an approximate algorithm based on the bisection method to solve this problem and the 
technique reduces the optimization problem to a decision problem, where one needs to 
compute the shortest path such that the minimum distance to the demand points is not 
smaller that a certain amount r. To solve the decision task, Diaz-Banez, Gomez and 
Toussaint transform the problem to the computation of the shortest path avoiding 
obstacles. This approach provides efficient algorithms to compute shortest obnoxious 
paths under several kinds of distances. 
[35] study the determination of optimal routes for hazardous material 
transportation trying to find trade-off solutions among many conflicting objectives in 
the analysis, such as travel cost, population exposure and environmental risk or security 
concerns. The authors use as generalized objective the product of the different 
objective functions and solve a complex shortest path problem that often present 
several “efficient'' solutions. A case study with 8 objective functions has been carried 
out on a road network in Singapore. A geographical information system is used to 
quantify road link attributes, which are assumed linear and deterministic for the sake of 
simplicity. The proposed algorithm derives four significantly different routes, which 
conform to intuition. 
[36] propose a novel vehicle routing and scheduling problem in transporting 
hazardous materials for networks with multiple time-varying attributes. It actually aims 
to identify all nondominated time-varying paths with fixed departure times at the origin 
and fixed waiting times at intermediate nodes of the paths for each given pair of origin 
and destination. Three kinds of practical constraints must also respected: limited 
operational time period, limited service time, and limited waiting time window at each 
node. Based on the assumption of linear waiting attributes at a node, the proposed 
problem can be transformed into a static multiobjective shortest path problem in an 
acyclic network reconstructed by the space-time network technique. An efficient 
dynamic programming method is then developed. 
[103] analyzes the possible use of telegeomonitoring in HAZMAT transportation. 
The author proposes a telegeomonitoring system that uses a geographic information 
system to represent civil infrastructure (urban network, land use, industries, etc.) and a 
decision support systems technology to asses the risk and to evaluate the K-best paths 
that minimize transportation risk. To this end, routing algorithms on graphs are 
extended to deal with fuzzy risk; in particular, the K-best fuzzy shortest paths. 
[104] proposes a model of flow propagation, assuming “packets” of vehicles and 
uniformly accelerated movement. Such an approach allows the author to propose a 
mesoscopic model of the HAZMAT vehicles movements that appears lifelike in the 
representation of outflow dynamics and easy polinomiale to solve. 
[31] study the problem of routing hazardous material on a multimodal network 
with time-varying link travel times and intermodal options. The problem is formulated 
as a Dynamic Program and an intermodal/multimodal shortest path algorithm is 
modified to compute minimum risk paths by combining the available transport modes, 
while accounting for transfer delays and transportation costs. The algorithm is 
implemented on a test network to observe changes in the solution under different 
scenarios. Computational performance is evaluated on networks of different sizes and 
the algorithm’s efficient running time makes it appropriate for use on realistic networks 
for both planning and real-time operations. 
[19] focus on the effects of weather systems on HAZMAT routing. They start by 
analyzing the effects of a weather system on a vehicle traversing a single link. This 
helps characterize the time-dependent attributes of a link due to movement of the 
weather systems. This analysis is used as a building block for the problem of finding a 
least risk path for HAZMAT transportation on a network exposed to weather changes. 
Several methods are offered to solve the underlying problem, and computational results 
are reported. Two conclusions are drawn from this paper: (1) it is possible to determine 
the time-dependent attributes for links on a network provided that some assumptions on 
the nature of the weather system are made; (2) heuristics can provide effective 
solutions for practical size problems while allowing for parking the vehicle to avoid 
weather system effects; technologies (4) how to route waste residues to disposal centres. 
The model has the objective of minimizing both the total cost and the transportation 
risk. 
[20] propose a new multiobjective location-routing model that is object of a large-
scale implementation in the Central Anatolian region of Turkey. The aim of the 
proposed model is to answer to the following questions: (1) where to open treatment 
centres and with which technologies, (2) where to open disposal centres, (3) how to 
route different types of hazardous waste to which of the compatible treatment 
technologies (4) how to route waste residues to disposal centres. The model has the 
objective of minimizing both the total cost and the transportation risk. The model 
proposed is manageable for a realistic problem in the Central Anatolian region of 
Turkey. Given that the hazardous waste management problem is a strategic one that 
will be solved infrequently, the authors believe that the computational effort is 
reasonable for problems with up to 20 candidate sites and that the application is a few 
orders of magnitude better than other applications in the literature. Most of the papers 
present applications for small problems such as with 10 or 15 generation nodes and 
with 3 or 4 candidate sites, whereas Alumur and Kara applied their model with 92 
generation nodes and with 15 and 20 candidate sites. As another research direction, the 
authors suggest that they can include other objectives of the hazardous waste 
management problem in their model. For example, one can maximize the energy 
production after the incineration process. Differently, one can minimize the risk due to 
the location of the treatment facility. When multiple objectives are considered, the 
model can be managed with different multi-objective solution techniques. Alumur and 
Kara propose a relatively simple multi-objective solution technique for ease of 
application. Apart from the different objectives, one can expand the mathematical 
model so that the locations of the recycling facilities and the corresponding routing 
strategies are also determined. Lastly, a multi-period version of the model can be used 
to schedule the processing of different types of waste. In this case, the compatibility 
constraint will gain more importance. That is, any new model should not allow wastes 
that are not compatible with each other to be transported or incinerated at the same time. 
[22] study how undesirable consequences of hazardous materials incidents can be 
mitigated by quick arrival of specialized response teams at the accident site. They 
present a novel methodology to determine the optimal design of a specialized team 
network so as to maximize its ability to respond to such incidents in a region. They 
show that this problem can be represented via a maximal arc-covering model. They 
discuss two formulations for the maximal arc-covering problem, a known one and a 
new one. Through computational experiments, the authors establish that the known 
formulation has excessive computational requirements for large-scale problems, 
whereas the alternative model constitutes a basis for an efficient heuristic. The 
methodology is applied to assess the emergency response capability to transport 
incidents, which involve gasoline, in Quebec and Ontario. [105] point out the 
possibility of a significant improvement via relocation of the existing specialized teams, 
currently stationed at the shipment origins. 
[24] study the problem of managing a set of HAZMAT requests in terms of 
HAZMAT shipment route selection and actual departure time definition. For each 
HAZMAT shipment, a set of minimum and equitable risk alternative routes from origin 
to destination points and a preferred departure time are given. The aim is to assign a 
route to each HAZMAT shipment and schedule them on the assigned routes in order to 
minimize the total shipment delay, while equitably spreading the risk spatially and 
preventing the risk induced by vehicles travelling too close to each other. This 
HAZMAT shipment scheduling problem is modelled as a job-shop scheduling problem 
with alternative routes. No-wait constraints arise in the scheduling model as well, since, 
supposing that no safe area is available, when a HAZMAT vehicle starts travelling 
from the given origin it cannot stop until it arrives at the given destination. A tabu 
search algorithm is proposed for the problem, which is experimentally evaluated on a 
set of realistic test problems over a regional area, evaluating the provided solutions also 
with respect to the total route risk and length. 
[26] consider the problem of designating HAZMAT routes in and through a major 
population centre. Initially, they restrict the attention to a minimally connected network 
(a tree) where we can predict accurately the flows on the network. They formulate the 
tree design problem as an integer programming problem with an objective of 
minimizing the total transport risk. Such design problems of moderate size can be 
solved using commercial solvers. Then they develop a simple construction heuristic to 
expand the solution of the tree design problem by adding road segments. Such 
additions provide carriers with routing choices, which usually increase risks but reduce 
costs. The heuristic adds paths incrementally, which allows local authorities to trade off 
risk and cost. Erkut and Alp use the road network of the city of Ravenna, Italy, as a 
case study. 
[27] consider an integrated routing and scheduling problem in HAZMAT 
transportation when accident rates, population exposure, and link durations on the 
network vary with time of day. They minimize risk subject to a constraint on the total 
duration of the trip and allow for stopping at the nodes of the network. The authors 
consider four versions of this problem with increasingly more realistic constraints on 
driving and waiting periods, and propose pseudo-polynomial dynamic programming 
algorithms for each version. They use a realistic example network to experiment with 
theirs algorithms and provide examples of the solutions generated. The computational 
effort required for the algorithms is reasonable, making them good candidates for 
implementation in a decision-support system. 
The en-route stops allow us to take full advantage of the time-varying nature of 
accident probabilities and exposure and result in the generation of routes that are 
associated with much lower levels of risk than those where no waiting is allowed. 
4. Synthesis and Conclusions 
4.1. Synthesis 
Ethics is not a substitute for a fundamentally sound business strategy, and so it is 
important to provide value-added tools for companies to help them manage all aspects 
of sustainable and socially responsible business practices in the HAZMAT area. In 
general, the studies in the HAZMAT transport literature do not have an exploratory 
modelling focus. Rather, various analytical equations for risk are used in route 
optimization or quantitative risk assessment research. The lack of focus on exploratory 
modelling of risk in terms of its important variables presents a gap or opportunity in the 
HAZMAT literature. 
[28] reflected on the state-of-the-art as of 2005, and pointed out a number of 
directions for future research. In the following two years, some of the problem areas 
proposed in [106][107]and in [28] were investigated by researchers, whereas many 
others remained relatively unexplored. From the methodological perspectives, global 
routing problems on stochastic time-varying networks received no attention despite 
their relevance and application potential. 
HAZMAT transportation network design problem which considers all involved 
parties (government and the carriers) is a relatively young research topic. The most 
obvious extension of the existing models in this area is to incorporate uncertainty and 
consider multiple objectives as the HAZMAT transportation problems are highly 
stochastic in nature and involve multiple criteria (and players). There is an increase on 
utilizing geographic information systems either for data input or combined with 
optimization models to conduct more realistic risk assessment. We believe that there 
are still many important OR problems in HAZMAT transportation. Researchers can 
find additional important references in [108-266]. However, we think the focus will 
shift from a priori optimization toward real-time adaptive decision making for several 
reasons, such as the availability of the necessary technology and data, as well as 
security concerns. While it is rather unfortunate that terrorist attacks can and do happen, 
their possibility opens up a new frontier for operations researchers in general, and 
HAZMAT transport researchers in particular. 
4.2. Conclusions 
• Researchers need to have access to high quality accident probability data and 
empirical or theoretical research that leads to improvements in the quality of 
such data would be welcome. 
• Applying national data uniformly on all road segments of similar type is quite 
problematic since it ignores hot spots such as road intersections, highway 
ramps, and bridges. 
• There is no agreement on general truck accident probabilities and conflicting 
numbers are reported by different researchers. 
• Given the limitation of QRA, and the fact that public opposition is a function 
of perceived risks, perhaps more attention should be paid to quantifying and 
modeling of perceived risks. We believe more work is needed to improve our 
understanding of how perceived risks change as a function of the hazardous 
substance, the distance to a hazardous activity, and the volume of the activity. 
• More work is needed to improve understanding of how perceived risks change 
as a function of the hazardous substance, the distance to a hazardous activity, 
and the volume of the activity. 
• Geographic information systems make it possible to use more precise 
population information. However, using census-based population data for 
daytime HAZMAT movements makes little sense since census data is 
residence-based and most residents are not at home during the day. 
Researchers need to take the next step and incorporate day versus night 
population distributions, as well as high-density population installations such 
as schools and hospitals. While this is done relatively easily for QRA of a 
single route, it is more complicated to generate the necessary data for an entire 
transportation network. 
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